A Secret Agreement Between the U.S. and Japan Makes Japanese Ports and Airports the U.S. Nuclear Bases
Japan has adopted the three non-nuclear principles. However, a secret agreement between the U.S. and Japan has enabled the U.S. to ruin it and put the world in danger of a nuclear conflict.
Japan has been made nuclear attacks twice, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and is the only nation to be hit by atomic bombs in the world.
Japanese public opinion has opposed nuclear weapons. Especially after the U.S. carried out a thermonuclear test at the Bikini Atoll in March 1954, irradiating the Marshall Islands residents and ships that fished around the Atoll, including Japanese Daigo Fukuryu Maru. The Japanese citizens voluntarily started a movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs and collected 32,590,907 signatures by September 1955. The number was approximately 60% of the population over 15.
On December 11, 1967, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato stated at Diet that Japan was not to own nuclear weapons, neither to produce nor to allow them into the country. This statement is called the three non-nuclear principles and was one reason Sato received the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. In 1971, the Diet adopted a resolution on observance of the principles. As of 2023, an opinion poll showed that 80 percent of Japanese people considered Japan should maintain the three non-nuclear principles. However, the U.S. had brought nuclear weapons into Japan and is still able to do so.
The old Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement between the U.S. and Japan took effect in 1952. Under them, the U.S. had to notify Japan when the U.S. warships entered a Japanese port, but it didn't need to clarify whether they carried nuclear weapons or not.
Probably the first time the U.S. had brought nuclear weapons into Japan was in 1953. An aircraft carrier, USS Oriskany, called at Yokosuka, was equipped with nuclear weapons. The U.S. aimed to make Japan a foothold for atomic attack on the Soviet Union and North Korea.
In 1960, the U.S. and Japan revised the Security Treaty, abolished the Administrative Agreement, and signed the Status of Forces Agreement. Based on Article Ⅵ of the new Security Treaty, the U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter and Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi exchanged notes promising that "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan [...] shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."
The Japanese government repeatedly explained to the nation that "major changes in their equipment" meant introducing nuclear warheads and medium and long-range missiles and the construction of these bases, based on the MacArthur-Fujiyama Verbal agreement, and warships carrying nuclear weapons call at a Japanese port are included in the "introduction."
If the U.S. warships and vessels equipped with nuclear weapons want to call at a Japanese port, it is necessary to consult with Japan. Successive Japanese governments stated that there hadn't been a consultation, so there hadn't been an introduction of nuclear weapons.
However, in 1974, U.S. Navy Admiral Eugene LaRocque stated at the hearing of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that "any ship that is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, carries nuclear weapons. They do not offload them when they go into foreign ports such as Japan or other countries."
In 1981, ex-U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer said that nuclear weapons introduction meant placing or installing them in Japan, and U.S. warships and aircraft that were loading nuclear weapons transiting Japanese territorial waters and air were different issues. He also said that U.S. warships carrying atomic weapons calling at a Japanese port didn't mean "introducing" and that there was an agreement between Washington and Tokyo.
By 2000, an outline of the secret agreement was broadly known because the U.S. had made the official papers public. Japanese people couldn't believe their government's explanation anymore.
In Japan, the Democratic Party defeated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the August 2009 election and established a new regime. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada ordered the examination of secret agreements regarding the transfer of nuclear weapons and other issues. In the examination, the advisory committee on the so-called secret agreement issues found a copy of a classified document called "Record of Discussion" signed by U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur and Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama on January 6, 1960, two weeks before the U.S. and Japan signed the new Security Treaty.
Article 2, paragraph A reads, "'Major changes in their equipment' is understood to mean the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, including intermediate and long-range missiles as well as the construction of bases for such weapons, and will not, for example, mean the introduction of non-nuclear weapons including short-range missiles without nuclear components." As Tokyo explained, the introduction of nuclear weapons was included in "Major changes in their equipment."
According to another document, on April 4, 1963, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer conveyed Washington's interpretation to Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira that the word "introduce" implies placing or installing on Japanese soil and would not apply to nuclear weapons on a vessel in Japanese waters or ports. Reischauer also referred to another clause of the Record of Discussion.
Article 2, paragraph C reads," 'Prior consultation' will not be interpreted as affecting present procedures regarding the deployment of United States armed forces and their equipment into Japan and those for the entry of United States military aircraft and the entry into Japanese waters and ports by the United States naval vessels, except in the case of major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces."
As mentioned above, under the old Security Treaty and the Administrative Agreement, the U.S. didn't need to clarify whether its warships entered a Japanese port carrying nuclear weapons or not.
Reischauer also rehearsed the U.S. Neither Confirm nor Deny (NCND) policy, which refuses to provide the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location.
In the 1963 talks, the U.S. government clearly stated its interpretation, and the Japanese government certainly learned there was a quite possibility U.S. vessels or aircraft in Japanese ports or airports had carried nuclear weapons without prior consultation. However, Tokyo didn't object.
The advisory committee concluded the investigation that there was an implicit agreement between the U.S. and Japan. In the report, it stated that the U.S. had understood that Japan couldn't have openly permitted warships equipped with nuclear weapons to call at Japanese ports freely and that Japan had known the U.S. hadn't had the intention to do prior consultation regarding the issue. Washington and Tokyo kept the issue vague, and it was a broad, secret agreement.
The committee pointed out the lack of some essential documents and the possibility the Foreign Ministry officials had disposed of them systematically and intentionally before the information disclosure law took effect. At Diet, Kazuhiko Togo, ex-chief of the Foreign Ministry International Legal Affairs Bureau, testified that he had handed over the crucial documents to his successor and submitted a list of the classified papers. More details about the secret agreement would have come to light if the documents had been found.
In March 2010, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada summed up the investigation, stating that it had proven the difference in interpretation of introducing nuclear weapons between Washington and Tokyo. Although Okada and the then Prime Minister stated that the Japanese government would adhere to the three non-nuclear principles, they didn't intend to adjust the difference. Okada emphasized that the U.S. had changed its nuclear policy after 1991, and its aircraft, warships, and other vessels hadn't carried nuclear weapons anymore; therefore, he said it didn't matter.
On September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush pledged to cease deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft during "normal circumstances." The U.S. announced the completion of the proposed withdrawals in 1992.
However, the U.S. has reserved the right to redeploy these arms in a crisis, and there is no exact definition between the "tactical" and "strategic" categories regarding the range or yield of nuclear weapons, though generally, the tactical nuclear weapons are smaller in explosive power than strategic nuclear weapons.
Also, the U.S. policies have changed. For instance, the U.S. Navy has fielded the W76-2 low-yield nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead. The U.S. 2022 Nuclear Posture Review reads that the U.S. continues to field flexible nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific region, "including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and nuclear weapons." It would "work with Allies and partners to identify opportunities to increase the visibility of U.S. strategic assets to the region as a demonstration of U.S. resolve and commitment, including ballistic missile submarine port visits and strategic bomber missions."
The U.S. still adopts the Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) policy, which doesn't provide the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location, even when such location is known or obvious. The Department of Defense declares "to respond to public queries about information on nuclear-capable units, ships, submarines, and aircraft with the following statement: 'We do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines, or aircraft.' "
The U.S. nuclear weapons can enter Japanese ports and airports without prior consultation if Japan doesn't demand to abolish the secret agreement. Tokyo made the existence of the secret agreement clear, but it has been effective, and nothing has changed. Potentially and substantially, Japanese ports and airports are the U.S. bases from which it can launch nuclear weapons. The Japanese three non-nuclear principles have become dead letters. The U.S. NCND policy and the secret agreement have further complicated the situation in East Asia and the world and have put the world in danger of a nuclear conflict.
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